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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to analyse the political, social
and economic background of the divergence of Belarusian and
Ukrainian transitions. We focus on Belarus in order to find ex-
planation for questions such as why could Lukashenko remain
the authoritarian leader of Belarus, while in Ukraine the posi-
tion of the political elite had proved less stable and collapsed
in 2004. On the theoretical framework of elite-sociology, we
seek to determine whether the internal factors (as macroeco-
nomic conditions, standard of living, the oppressive nature of
the political system and the structure of the political elite) play
a significant role in the operation of the domino effect. This
article emphasises the determining role of immanent internal
factors, thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained
by the role of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of
democratic rights and the relatively good living conditions that
followed the transformational recession. Whilst in Ukraine, the
markedly different circumstances brought forth the success of
the Orange Revolution.
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1 Introduction
The political and economical transition of the Post-Soviet
states has been far from a straightforward change into democ-
racy and market economy. As Merkel remarked, in 1994 [32]
even at the beginning of the transition period, it is impossible to
create a general theory of transition. This process is analysed
in detail from several perspectives, however, most of them deal
with elite strategies and do not focus on social processes and
social pressure on elite decisions (Whitehead, 2001 [59]).The
aspect of this paper is unique because we try to synthetize the
political, social and economic aspect of transition. Our aim is
to analyse the socioeconomic background of the divergence of
Belarussian and Ukrainian transitions. The differences in the
methods of designing the transformation were recognizable by
the mid 1990’s (Portes, 1994 [42]). The “traps” and difficulties
of the transformation have been evident since then. The author-
itarian regimes concerning the number of the region’s countries
have recently collapsed, like in Georgia, Ukraine or Kyrgyzstan.
Social discontent, which proved to be one of the major catalysts
of the changes in these countries, has not gone large-scale in
Belarus yet. Why is the power of the Belarus elite stronger than
that of other elites in the process of democratization? If the tran-
sition is regarded as an elite-driven process, the question arises:
in what degree is it due to the oppressing nature of the regime,
and to what extent can it be explained by economic recession,
or its effects on society.
In this essay we focus on Ukraine and Belarus, the two largest
Western neighbours of Russia, in order to find an explanation
as to why Alexander Lukashenko was able to remain in power
while in Ukraine the power of the elite had proven to be weaker
and collapsed at the end of 2004. According to this study, the
accumulation of political and societal discontent and the exis-
tence of the forums and institutions articulating these views have
made together the political changes possible by the end of 2004.
In Belarus, due to the restricted access to the democratic forums
and the internal support of the political elite, which stems from
the relatively good economic results of the country, it meant that
the force of the social movements has been relatively weak. In
other words, using Polanyi’s methodology, we can say that the
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Belarusian society is in contrast with the Ukrainian that has not
had to respond in any way to the market impulses to protect it-
self (Polanyi, 1942 [40]). In Belarus there has neither been any
strong pressure on the society to react against capitalism and
transformation, nor any effective channels to influence the first
period of transition.
Transformation is a process that depends on three main
groups of factors: the initial conditions, the policies pursued,
and the external environment (Ellman, 1994 [8]). Some theo-
rists (see the classic work of. Lipset, 1959 [30]) analysed the
socioeconomic requisites of democratic regimes. Certain re-
searchers point to external forces (see e.g. Vachudova, 2006
[55]). Geopolitics and the political and economic support of
Russia, the EU and the US are two great powers that play an im-
portant role in the maintenance of the elite’s power or in the pos-
sible rise of power of the opposition. The domino effect theory,
which has often been used for the analysis of the Cold War, can
also be adopted for the process of transition; democratization
and distancing from the Russian influence (see e.g. Starr, 1991
[48]; Starr – Lindborg, 2003 [49]; Bunce – Wolchnik, 2006 [6];
McFaul, 2005 [31]). We do not deny the statements of path-
dependency (Stark, 1992, [46]; Stark, 1995 [47]) and the impor-
tance of initial conditions, but we presume that the similar initial
conditions in the two countries do not influence the success of
the transition processes. Some scholars have asserted that eth-
nicity has a great impact on the support of democratization and
marketization in post-Soviet states (see e.g. Kuzio, 2001 [28];
Eke – Kuzio, 2000 [9]). Their analyses say that ethnic Ukraini-
ans, are more supportive of market economy and democracy
than ethnic Russians and Belarussians. Other results focus on
both internal and external political effect, but neglect the role of
economic situation and social factors (see e.g. Way, 2005 [57],
Way, 2006 [58]). Nevertheless, we have to pose the question:
under similar geopolitical circumstances, which country is to be
considered as a weak domino, and what are the internal factors
that play role in answering the question whether discontent can
be articulated to and resulted in political changes? This article
emphasises the determining role of immanent internal factors,
thus the political stability in Belarus can be explained by the role
of the suppressing political regime, the hindrance of democratic
rights and the relatively good living conditions that followed the
transformational collapse, while in Ukraine, the markedly dif-
ferent circumstances brought forth success of the Orange Revo-
lution.
This essay is constituted from the following parts. Firstly, it
is argued that the elites play a very prominent role in the trans-
formation of the institutions, especially in the transitional period
(see Szalai, 1997 [51]; Szalai, 2001 [52]). Higley and Lengyel
2000 [24] argue that elite configurations influence the opera-
tion of institutions in transition. Some scholars suggest that all
democratic transitions are the products of elite choices (Higley
and Burton, 1989 [22]). By the economic approach presented
here, we cast light on the fragility of the elites’ position, thus
providing an economic explanation for their legitimacy. Sec-
ondly, we review the causes of social discontent and their ele-
ments of articulation. As follows, we analyse some key indica-
tors of the so called perceived economy and figures of the stan-
dard of living, since, according to our hypothesis, the effect of
the transition period on the standard of living is a main factor re-
sponsible for social discontent. The existence or non-existence
of democratic institutions is a key factor of the society’s ability
to mediate their needs or criticism towards the elite. Finally, we
will attempt to summarize the socioeconomic background of the
divergence of the two political systems.
2 Theoretical framework
2.1 The elites’ institution-forming roles
Historically, even before the Central-Eastern European tran-
sitions, elites and elite settlements have always played a signif-
icant role in consolidation of socio-economic systems, as it is
empirically verified by Higley and Burton, 1987 [23]. Even the
classical elite theories conclude that elite variations have deter-
minate effects on the character of political regimes (Mosca 1939
[34]). The most relevant antecedents of Central-Eastern Euro-
pean transitional and elite theories are the frameworks analyz-
ing the Latin-American and the Southern European transitions.
Their consequences are limited: in the bipolar system, under
different political and economic circumstances, the role of elites
was also different.
Elite-analyses of transforming economies depict the transi-
tions as elite-governed processes (for further explanations, see:
Pigenko, Weise and Brown, 2003 [38]). These are in accordance
with the observations of neo-institutionalism in those countries
or regions where organic, bottom-up and slower-paced institu-
tional development was not possible, the institutions have been
installed in a top-to-bottom way (see Szabó, 1994 [50]), to the
pattern of foreign examples. Higley and Lengyel, 2000 [24] re-
fine the role of elites because they presume that the relationship
between the institutions and the elites is not a one-way road:
elites determine institutions and vice versa. They also empha-
size the elites’ commitment to institutions especially because in-
stitutions are in flux and elites have wider latitude of choice and
action. The connection between elites and democracy is well
disputed in the literature (see Etzioni-Halevy, 1993 [10]).
The intellectual elites of most of the post-socialist countries
aimed at the adoption of a democratic and market-economy es-
tablishment in order to be able to provide higher standards of
living, cultural and political framework for their people. Even
in Central Europe, where the democracies developed easier, the
elites had a prominent role in the development of the founda-
tions of democracy and the market economy. Theoretically and
practically it is necessary to distinguish institutional design and
institutional mechanisms. Institutional design (designing the
structural elements of the new socio-economic system, for ex-
ample aiming market economy) is very similar in every country
in the region, but the role of elites in institutional mechanisms
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(instruments for implementing design patterns) is highly diverse
(Higley and Lengyel, 2000 [24]).
In Eastern Europe, where the process of democratization has
some been slower and, may even has stopped altogether in some
countries, and where, due to state property or the state’s bureau-
cratic regulatory mechanisms, the political elites have more in-
fluence on the economy, it is unquestionable that the transforma-
tion is an elite-driven process. We can conclude that the ratio of
the elite circulation and the elite reproduction1 influences “only”
the quality of the resulting system, not the elite-driven nature
of the transition (for a more detailed discussion, see Szelényi
and Szelényi, 1995 [53]). Furthermore, the absence of any tra-
dition of elite autonomy, and the lack of democratic traditions
in the Post-Soviet states make democracy not a likely outcome
(Etzioni-Halevy, 1993 [10]).
Depending on the configuration of national elites several
regime types can come into existence. Elites are wide differ-
entiated when the elite groups are heterogeneous, functionally
distinct, autonomous, and organizationally diverse. Conflicts,
deep hostilities are common. Elite unity means that the different
groups of elite share common values; there are norms which are
accepted by them, they share their political understanding about
the proprieties of political conduct. Higley and Burton 1989 [22]
remark that the unity of national elites is one of the most impor-
tant determinants of regime forms. Table 1 shows the possible
outcomes.
The main consequence of elite disunity is regime instability.
The elite circulation patterns depend on the mode and scope of
changing in the structure of the elite according to Table 2.
Lengyel and Higley draw the conclusion that these patterns
can be paired according to Table 3.
The later chapters explain that the Belarussian system without
relevant opposition, with narrow elite differentiation and with
strong elite unity is a typical totalitarian regime. According to
this theoretical framework the elite circulation could be deep,
wide and sudden there. In today’s Ukraine, where the different
groups of elite seem to be highly differentiated and the unity of
elites is weak, there is a typically unconsolidated democracy,
where theoretically the reproduction circulation is the typical
pattern. As Higley and Burton 1989 [22] remark, a disunified
national elite produces a series of unstable regimes.
In Belarus, the elite reproduction, moreover the elite continu-
ity has not resulted in a markedly different political establish-
ment, and the economic transition is in a strange borderline on
the market economies typical of our region and that of state-
dominated economy. It was not in the interests of the politi-
cal elite to convert some of their political capital into economic
capital, since they were able to retain their power even after the
1990’s and they could postpone the forming of the new estab-
1Based on their article, we consider the circulation of elites as the emergence
of new people of different social classes. The elite reproduction is a process
which does not change the social composition of the elite.
lishment and the defining of the conversion ratios.
The key players of the present Ukrainian political elite: Yulia
Timoshenko, Viktor Yushchenko and Viktor Yanukovich have
been in the forefront of Ukrainian politics for years and the Or-
ange Revolution in 2004 merely rearranged the relative positions
of the players. Since then we have witnessed the redistribution
of power within this elite, but it seems none of the parties are
able to expel the other from the political field for a long time.
Nevertheless, the different economic lobbies bring a strong pres-
sure on the principal actors of political life.
Due to the interpenetration and traversing between the elite
groups we will not discriminate the different groups in this es-
say. Our approach is positionalist and stratificational, and is
based on the role of actors of society. According to the former,
we regard the elites as groups of individuals who are in the po-
sition of making decisions (Higley and Burton1989 [22]). The
stratificational approach assumes that the installation of institu-
tions is a top-down process and it is the elite in position of power
who builds and monopolizes the system. Although the relative
autonomy of the institutions and their independence from their
establishers are subject to professional debate (Greven, 1995
[20]), we assume that the institutions cannot be considered as
autonomous agents since it is the individuals (the elite) who de-
termine their character, quality, functions and limits. O’Donell
and Schmitter 1986 [37] also emphasize the role of actors and
elites, but they promote the democratic changes only if their ben-
efit from transition is higher than their costs of maintaining the
authoritarian system.
In spite of these, the economic results and their effects on so-
ciety are only partly dependent on the system and institutions
established and influenced by the elites. Geopolitics, external
processes, the collapse of export markets and the transforma-
tional recession are all such external circumstances which are
beyond the “action radius” of the elites. However, the elites, by
their economic policy-making influence on the transition also
have an effect on the macroeconomic indicators, just as much as
on redistribution or on the ratio of income distribution, etc.
From our point of view, the essence of this approach of exam-
ining the transition through economic performance is that eco-
nomic development and the material prosperity of the society
play an important role in the consolidation of the transformed
or newly-developed political system (see Plasser-Ulram, 1995
[41]). Their share in shaping the political establishment, extend-
ing democratic rights, and creating political institutions is even
larger, almost exclusive, especially where traditions of exerting
social pressure are weaker, such as in Eastern Europe.
2.2 The causes of social discontent and their elements of
articulation
We must therefore, investigate the ways the elites influence
society, or in other words: what the economic, societal, and in-
stitutional factors affecting the social discontent that emerge in
the process of economic transition are. Political constraints and
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Tab. 1. Configuration of National Elites and Associated Regime Types
Elite unity
Strong Weak
Elite differentiation
Wide Consensual elite(consolidated democracy) Fragmented elite(unconsolidated democracy)
Narrow Ideocratic elite(totalitarian or post-totalitarian regime) Divided elite(authoritarian or sultanistic)
Source: Higley, John - Lengyel, György (eds.): Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis. Lanham, 2000. pp. 3. [24]
Tab. 2. Patterns of Elite Circulation
Scope
Wide and deep Narrow and shallow
Mode
Gradual and peaceful Classic circulation Reproduction circulation
Sudden and coerced Replacement circulation Quasi-replacement circulation
Source: Higley, John – Lengyel, György (eds.): Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis. Lanham, 2000. pp. 4. [24]
the resistance of society can influence the process of transition
for many reasons (Roland, 1994 [43]; Roland, 1997 [44]). Even
in the case of Ukraine and Belarus, the autocratic regimes have
to respect society: hurting every group and damaging the wel-
fare of society leads to social discontent. Sanders (1995) [45]
argued that politicians have to distinguish real economy and per-
ceived economy and other empirical studies (for example Niemi,
Bremer and Heel, 1999 [36]) have shown the importance of per-
ceived economy in elections. Society only perceives a fraction
of the macroeconomic indicators of the transformational reces-
sion, for example the changes in real wages, inflation, economic
growth, unemployment rate, the amount of GDP per capita and
its growth rate. For the society, these factors are the indicators
of perceived economy.
The external or internal imbalances or structural problems,
even if they are unsustainable in the long run, do not lead to so-
cial discontent until they have an effect (by a minor adjustment,
economic shock therapy, or large-scale recession) on the per-
ceived economy, that is on the factors mentioned above.2 Nev-
ertheless, the improvement of the unperceived indicators can
actually have a deteriorating effect on the immediately perceiv-
able indicators. Therefore, it seems advisable to focus on those
macroeconomic indicators that the society can perceive in the
short term, as these have an immediate effect on the social con-
tentment/discontent and its manifestation. Greskovits (1995)
[19] argued that the manifestation of social discontent in tran-
sitional countries depends greatly on the structure of society, the
effects of transition on society, as well as the political system of
the country.
The instruments used to express social discontent are funda-
2 With the maintenance and amendment of the perceived economy’s indica-
tors, the Hungarian Kádár regime has managed to achieve a certain level of so-
cial satisfaction; the structural distortions and imbalances were hidden from the
society until the beginning of the transition. Thus, the factors of the percieved
economy can differ from the real state of the economy during a considerable
period of time. Certainly, this cannot apply automatically for the period of our
research: in case of both countries, the collapse in the indicators of the percieved
economy was remarkable.
mentally different in an established democracy and a dictator-
ship. In the former, many of the forms of discontent can be
handled by the system while it does not touch upon the sys-
tem’s foundations: democtratic systems aid the interests of the
majority, which can also mean the replacement of the elite (e.g.
with elections). In a dictatorship, the social discontent is di-
rected at the ruling elite and the foundations of the system at
the same time. The articulation forms of discontent are system-
dependent: civil disobedience can only be efficient in a democ-
racy (see Bence, 1991 [5]) but it is ineffective in a dictatorial
state. Revolution is the way to overthrow a dictatorship, and
strikes are not an effective measure of social discontent either,
if there are no independent unions. Without overgeneralizing in
our association of forms of protests and political systems it must
be admitted that in an authoritarian state the manifestation of so-
cial discontent is more difficult and can even be delayed in mani-
festation. Measuring it and the reliability of these measurements
leave much to be desired. Moreover, the absence of democratic
institutions is intended to cover up social discontent. This fact
seriously restricts the methodology of the present essay: the tra-
ditional forms of protests and the figures representing these can
only be used to measure social discontent with limitations.
3 Transformational recession in Ukraine and Belarus
All post-Soviet states suffered a major economic recession
in the 1990s. The reasons, which were analysed in detail in
the literature (see e. g. Williamson, 1993 [60]; Fischer, Sa-
hay, Végh, 1997 [11]), are not important from our point of view.
The gravity of the recession is unquestionable, but the question
arises whether the Belarussian recession can be regarded as out-
standing in the region. Is it possible to explain the measure of
social discontent with the gravity of this recession, felt by the
whole society? It seems helpful to compare the Belarussian and
Ukrainian figures, as the downfall of the Ukrainian regime was
largely due to economic reasons, and also because by comparing
the two sets of figures we can avoid a possible mistaken conclu-
sion arising from the fact that recession was deeper in Eastern
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Tab. 3. Patterns of Elite Circulation and Regimes
Scope
Wide and deep Narrow and shallow
Gradual and peaceful Classic circulation: Consensual
elite (consolidated democracy
Reproduction circulation: Frag-
mented elite (unconsolidated
democracy
Mode
Sudden and coerced Replacement circulation: Ideo-
cratic elite (totalitarian or post-
totalitarian regime
Quasi-replacement circulation: Di-
vided elite (authoritarian or sul-
tanistic)
Source: Higley, John – Lengyel, György (eds.): Elites after State Socialism: Theories and Analysis. Lanham, 2000. pp. 6. [24]
Europe than in the Central European region.
The Belarussian economy did not go through the fundamental
structural changes in the last 15 years; the predomination of state
property, the sectoral structure inherited from the Soviet system
and the bureaucratic governance of the economy are still very
typical. The liberalization of prices, started in 1992, as well as
the initial impetus of privatization, was stopped by an authori-
tarian intervention within a couple of years. Table 4 shows those
macroeconomic indicators that are perceivable for the society in
the short run.
The data above only reveals that the recession was of large-
scale in both countries. Based on these data it cannot be con-
firmed that the political changes in Ukraine and Belarus can be
linked with the degree of the recession.
However, the reliability of the above data and the drawn con-
clusions should be approached with due caution. The mere
difference between an inflation rate of 891.2% and another of
2,220.9% does not necessarily mean a difference in social dis-
content as well; more important is its effect on the level of real
wages. Neither does the official unemployment rate reflect the
real activity of the society on the labour market. Nevertheless,
it is worth comparing the development of GDP in the two coun-
tries.
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Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, 2008
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx [27]
Fig. 1. Chart 1: GDPGrowth in Belarus and Ukraine in Constant Price Level
(year-by-year, percentage)
Data show that the Belarussian economy has been on a growth
path since 1996, while in Ukraine the economy only started to
grow around the turn of the millennium. This suggests that the
Ukrainian economy had been slower in getting over a greater
transformational shock and thus it had posed a greater burden
on the people. The Belarussian economy showed its worst per-
formance in the middle of the 1990’s, the annual GDP in 1995
was at 2/3 of that of 1991 (in constant price level). According to
the estimates, GDP will be 42% larger in 2007 than in 1991. In
Ukraine, between 1992 and 2000 GDP was less than half of the
1991 level almost every year (IMF, 2008 [27]).
Regarding the GDP per capita in PPP (with 1996 as base
year), similar conclusions can be drawn. The Belarussian GDP
per capita has doubled between 1995 and 2003, while Ukrainian
figures show a different pattern: between 1993 and 2003 the
GDP per capita follows a U-shaped pattern, and the level of
GDP was only slightly higher at the end of the period than ten
years before (IMF, 2008 [27]). There is also a great difference
between the two countries in the ratio of consumption to GDP.
Since 2001, the value of this indicator has been above 60% in
Belarus, while in Ukraine it was about 55% during the past ten
years. The above indicators suggest that the economic situation
perceived by the society has been much more favourable in Be-
larus.
Altogether, we conclude that the Ukrainian economy has gone
through a longer and more serious transitional collapse.
Veress (1999) [56] suggested the calculation of the so-called
‘Misery’ and ‘Unpopularity’ indices to examine the relations of
economic policy and social contentment/discontent.3 The Mis-
ery Index and the Unpopularity Index have positive correlation
with social discontent, therefore it can be regarded as a rudimen-
tary numerical technique for them.
Contrary to previous data, in the case of these indices one
cannot see a considerable dissimilarity between the figures of
the two countries. The extremely high values and turbulent be-
haviour of the indicators are due to the hyperinflation. Using
the present weighting scheme, the misery and unpopularity in-
dices tend to disregard the importance of economic growth and
3 Misery index = inflation rate + unemployment rate; unpopularity index =
inflation rate – 3GDP growth
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Tab. 4. Inflation, Price Level, Economic Growth and Unemployment in Belarus and Ukraine (1992-2008)
Rate of inflation (%) Price level (1992=1) GDP growth, constant
prices (%)
Registered unemployment
rate (end of year)
Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine Belarus Ukraine
1992 970.3 1,210.0 1.0 1.0 −9.6 −9.7 0.5 n/a
1993 1,190.2 4,734.9 12.9 48.4 −7.6 −14.2 1.4 0.4
1994 2,220.9 891.2 299.5 479,.2 −11.7 −22.9 2.1 0.4
1995 709.3 376.4 2,423.6 2,282.8 −11.3 −12.2 2.9 0.6
1996 52.7 80.2 3,700.5 4,114.5 2.8 −10.0 4.0 1.5
1997 63.8 15.9 6,062.2 4,768.0 11.4 −3.0 2.8 2.7
1998 73.0 10.6 10,488.7 5,272.3 8.4 −1.9 2.3 4.3
1999 293.7 22.7 41,297.6 6,468.2 3.4 −0.2 2.1 5.5
2000 168.6 28.2 110,925.8 8,292.5 5.8 5.9 2.1 5.5
2001 61.1 12.0 178,738.0 9,284.1 4.7 9.2 2.3 4.8
2002 42.6 0.8 254,823.2 9,354.4 5.0 5.2 3.0 5.0
2003 28.4 5.2 327,187.9 9,841.8 7.0 9.6 3.1 4.8
2004 18.1 9.0 386,389.3 10,731.4 11.4 12.1 1.9 4.8
2005 10.3 13.4 426,326.5 12,171.4 4.0 2.7 1.5 4.3
2006 7.0 9.0 456,135.2 13,268.0 10.0 7.1 1.2 3.7
2007 8.4 12.8 494,582.9 14,972.0 8.2 7.3 n/a n/a
2008 11.2 21.9 549,763.5 18,253.8 7.1 5.6 n/a n/a
Source: Inflation, economic growth: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008,
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx [27]
Price level: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, April 2008, http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx [27],
own calculations
Unemployment: ILO: ILO Database’ http://laborsta.ilo.org/cgi-bin/brokerv8.exe [25]
Data from 2007 are estimates and from 2008 are forecasts.
Tab. 5. Indices about Social Judgement of Economic Policy in Ukraine and Belarus (1992-2008)
Misery index Unpopularity index
Belarusia Ukraine Belarusia Ukraine
1992 970.8 999.1 1,239.1
1993 1,191.6 4,735.3 1213 4,777.5
1994 2223 891.6 2256 959.9
1995 712.2 377 743.2 413
1996 56.7 81.7 44.3 110.2
1997 66.6 18.6 29.6 24.9
1998 75.3 14.9 47.8 16.3
1999 295.8 28.2 283.5 23.3
2000 170.7 33.7 151.2 10.5
2001 63.4 16.8 47 −15.6
2002 45.6 5.8 27.6 −14.8
2003 31.5 10 7.4 −23.6
2004 20 13.8 −16.1 −27.3
2005 11.8 17.7 −1.7 5.3
2006 8.2 12.7 −23 −12.3
2007 −16.2 −9.1
2008 −10.1 5.1
Source: IMF: World Economic Outlook Database, 2008
http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/01/weodata/index.aspx [27]
and ILO: ILO Database, 2008 http://laborsta.ilo.org/cgi-bin/brokerv8.exe [26],
own calculations
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unemployment rate, because the extent of their change is over-
whelmed by the enormous inflation rates. Thus, the above in-
dices have proved to be inappropriate for the comparison of the
two countries.
The social costs in the transitional countries were unexpect-
edly large in the early 1990s (Ellman, 1994 [8]; Nelson, 1997
[35]). The development of the standard of living is an important
terminant of a regime’s legitimacy.
Let us review some of the social indicators to see if there are
any differences between the countries which might help us un-
derstand the significant difference in the protesting activities.
In Ukraine, the average life expectancy at birth was 69.5 years
in 2005, which falls short of the 70.1 level of the 1970’s. In Be-
larus, the average life expectancy at birth was 69.9 years in 2002,
which is lower than the 71.5 years indicated in the first half of
the 1970s. Government spending on health is 4.8% in Belarus
and 2.9% in Ukraine in relation to the GDP. Healthcare spend-
ing (public and private) on purchasing power parity is USD 464
per capita in Belarus while only USD 176 in Ukraine. The per-
centage of malnourished population is 3% in Belarus but 4% in
Ukraine, according to UN data. Public spending on education
is 6% of GDP in Belarus, and 4.2% in Ukraine. The number
of landline phones per 1000 inhabitants was 299 in Belarus and
216 in Ukraine; the number of internet users was 81.6 and 18
respectively.
In the early 1990s the Human Development Index (HDI)
started to decline in both countries, with Ukrainian figures start-
ing from a higher level, and declining faster than in Belarus.
This trend halted in 1995; the HDI index in that year was 0.756
for Ukraine and 0.755 for Belarus. Since then, both countries
have shown some improvement, but while the level of Belarus-
sian HDI index in 2005 was above the 0.790 index of 1990,
Ukraine at 0.788 was still below the 0.809 in 1990 (UNDP 2008
[54]).
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Source: UNDP: Human Development Report, 2007/2008
http://hdrstats.undp.org/countries [55]
Fig. 2. Chart 2: Human Development Index in Ukraine and Belarus (1990-
2005)
These figures, and especially the macroeconomic data, are
rather surprising. It is clear that there has been a considerable
decline in the standards of living; though social damage was
smaller in Belarus. Apart from the oppressing nature of the po-
litical system, this economic factor, albeit to a lesser extent, is
the cause of the weaker articulation of social discontent in Be-
larus.
4 The possibilities and limits of articulation in Ukraine
and Belarus
Now that we have explored the tensions in society, let us
survey the ways society could articulate their dissatisfaction
towards the elites in Ukraine and Belarus through the means
of elections and civil movements. In our review we will
focus on these forums in order to shed light on the demo-
cratic/antidemocratic responses of the elites and the affinity of
society to use these channels.
The quality of institutions and procedures in connection with
political transformations is presented on a numerical scale by
the yearly publication of Freedom House.4
5The figures shed light on the suppressive, antidemocratic
character of the Belarussian regime, and on the fact that the pos-
sibilities of articulating discontent against the political leader-
ship are far larger in Ukraine.
In our review of Ukraine the emphasis will be on the months
of the Orange Revolution. In this country of 50 million inhabi-
tants, the number of anomalies and abuses surrounding elections
proceedings had been on a rise since the latter half of the 1990s6,
which meant that the voters had been restricted in expressing
their will, but all this changed during the Orange Revolution in
2004. Although a constitutional reform passed in 2003 allowed
the then President Leonid Kuchma to run for the Presidency,
which is the most influential position in the country, for the third
time, he declined this in 2004. Thus, the two contestants for the
seat were Viktor Yanukovych (prime minister 2002-2004), and
Viktor Yushchenko (prime minister 1999-2001). Nationalism
became a significant factor in the political system in Ukraine in
the 1990s (Pirie, 1996 [39]). While Yanukovych was supported
by the so-called Donetsk-Clan and the Russian-speaking popu-
lation, and was regarded as the heir of Kuchma; Yushchenko, in
the colours of the Our Ukraine bloc and backed mostly by the
Ukrainian-speaking population of the west of the country and
other western countries, urged a more pro-western approach as
well as promised strict anti-corruption measures and market re-
4 The method of choosing and using Freedom House indices could be prob-
lematic. However, we do not consider it a relevant or cardinal problem in this
study, because we accept Havrylyshyn’s and van Rooden’s results who showed
that there is strong correlation between the similar insitutional indices of differ-
ent institutes (EBRD, Heritage Foundation, Freedom House, Euromoney) (see
Havrylyshyn – van Rooden, 2001 [21]).
5The score of 1 signifies the features which characterize an established
democracy the most, and 7 is the value of the least characteristic ones. Each
figure refers to the previous year, for example data for 2006 refers to the period
between the 1st January 2005 and the 31th December 2005.
6 Leonid Kuchma has gained power through a relatively fair competition
against Leonid Kravchuk in 1994, but during the following parliamentary elec-
tions and the presidental elections in 1999 he did not recoil from using unfair
tools.
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Tab. 6. Political indices in Ukraine and Belarus (1997-2007)
1997 1998 1999-2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007
Election process
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 7.00 7.00 7.00
UKR 3.25 3.50 3.50 4.00 4.50 4.00 4.25 3.50 3.25 3.00
Civil society
BEL 5.25 5.75 6.00 6.50 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.50
UKR 4.00 4.25 4.00 3.75 3.75 3.50 3.75 3.00 2.75 2.75
Independent media
BEL 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75
UKR 4.50 4.75 5.00 5.25 5.50 5.50 5.50 4.75 3.75 3.75
Governance
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.25 6.25 6.50 6.50 6.50 n/a n/a n/a
UKR 4.50 4.75 4.75 4.75 5.00 5.00 5.25 n/a n/a n/a
Administration of justice
BEL 6.00 6.25 6.50 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75 6.75
UKR 3.75 4.00 4.50 4.50 4.75 4.50 4.75 4.25 4.25 4.25
Corruption
BEL n/a n/a 5.25 5.25 5.25 5.50 5.75 6.00 6.25 6.25
UKR n/a n/a 6.00 6.00 6.00 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75 5.75
Democracy
BEL 5.90 6.20 6.25 6.38 6.38 6.46 6.54 6.64 6.71 6.68
UKR 4.00 4.25 4.63 4.71 4.92 4.71 4.88 4.50 4.21 4.25
Source: Freedom House: Nations in Transit: Belarus, 2006, p. 1.
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/belarus2006.pdf [14]
Freedom House: Nations in Transit: Ukraine, 2006, p. 1.
http://www.freedomhouse.hu/nitransit/2006/ukraine2006.pdf [15]
Freedom House: Nations in Transit: Belarus, 2007, p. 1.
http://www.freedomhouse.hu//images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007final/nit-ukraine-web.pdf [16]
and Freedom House: Nations in Transit: Ukraine, 2007, p. 1.
http://www.freedomhouse.hu//images/fdh_galleries/NIT2007final/nit-ukraine-web.pdf[17]
forms if elected.
The first round of Ukraine’s presidential election was held
on 31st October 2004 with a record-breaking 75.5% turnout,
the highest in the history of independent Ukraine. Yushchenko
gained 39.87% of the votes, while Yanukovych got 39.32% (Be-
ichelt – Pavlenko, 2005 [4]). Despite the presidential election
reform bill of 18 March 2004, which, for example, allowed each
of the parties to delegate 2 representatives to each of the lo-
cal polling-station committees where they had candidates; there
were a great number of concerns about the electoral process
and the fairness of the elections. Through channels of the pub-
lic administration, pressure was put on both private and pub-
lic sector employees, students and teachers alike to vote for,
and even to campaign for, the candidates supported by the out-
going president Kuchma. The media was also heavily biased
towards Yanukovych; he featured more prominently than the
other 22(!) candidates and the arch-rival Yushchenko almost
exclusively appeared in a negative light. In addition to this,
the Russian-speaking TV channels, available in most parts of
the country, lobbied intensively for Yanukovych. On top of it
all, President Putin visited Ukraine a couple of days before both
rounds of the election in order to be seen with Yanukovych and
gain more votes for him. At least 15 of the 23 candidates were
only “technical” aspirants for the presidential seat with links to
Yanukovych. With no independent programme or campaign,
they agitated for the person and programme of Yanukovych,
thereby decreasing the time Yushchenko could appear in the
media. These candidates further infringed the independency
of the polling station committees, through their representatives
(Freedom House, 2005 [13]). Finally, under mysterious circum-
stances, Yushchenko suffered dioxin-poisoning in September. It
is little short of a miracle that he survived, with dioxin-levels
2200-6600 times the normal concentration in his body, but the
scars are visible on his face to this day.
The run-off was held on 21 November, with an 80.4% turnout
and after counting the ballots Viktor Yanukovich seemed to have
won, gaining 49.46% of the votes against the “mere” 46.61% of
votes gained by Yushchenko. Foreign observers complained of
serious frauds, especially in the Donetsk region7, the hinterland
of Yanukovych. Meanwhile, supporters of Yushchenko organ-
ised mass demonstrations in Kiev and demanded new elections
because of vote-rigging. Donning the orange colour of the Our
Ukraine bloc, the protesters had also found the symbol of soli-
darity. Due to the internal and external pressure, the Ukrainian
Supreme Court annulled the results of the run-off on 3 December
and the re-run of the second round was held on 26 December. In-
ternational observers praised the conduct of the vote, which was
won by Viktor Yushchenko with 51.99% to 44.2% of the votes.
With this, the presidential system had also ended, as a consti-
tutional reform in 2004 extended the jurisdiction of the parlia-
ment. Starting from the elections in March 2006, the president
does not have the right to appoint the prime minister, and the
once formal general elections have suddenly had high-stakes, so
much so, that Ukrainian politics spent most of 2005 preparing
for the elections.
Since 2006 two parliamentary elections have been held in
Ukraine and coalition governments were formed. The elections
were fair, according to the reports of major international ob-
7 There have been four election districts with 100% turnout, and Yanukovych
has won in all of them, with a result of 97-99%.
Per. Pol. Soc. and Man. Sci.18 Ádám Mészáros / Zsolt Szabó
servation missions. However, the power of the parties of the
Orange Revolution has not been stabilized because of the per-
sonal conflicts among the parties. Consequently, it could happen
in Ukraine that the Party of Regions won the elections held in
March 2006 with 32.14%, formed a coalition government after
the election of 2006 with the backing of his rival’s Our Ukraine
bloc, and Yanukovich has been appointed Prime Minister in Au-
gust 2007 by Yushchenko. The winner of the election held in
September 2007 was also Yanukovich with 34.37%, but the par-
ties of Tymoshenko and Yushchenko succeeded to form a coali-
tion government and Tymoshenko was elected Prime Minister
in December 2007.
Civil movements and organizations played an important role
in the Orange Revolution as most of the society could not ex-
press their own will until 2004 due to the unfairness of the elec-
tions. The popularity of NGOs can be seen from their rising
numbers: in 1995 there were only 4,000, in 2000 30,000 and
by 2004 there were 37,000 non-governmental organizations in
Ukraine. The legal framework for non-profit activities is still
undefined; therefore they are not eligible for government funds
and cannot delegate representative to polling station commit-
tees, nevertheless, after all their activities, except donations and
membership fees, they have to pay taxes like profit-orientated
companies. Almost 60% of NGOs support themselves from in-
ternational and mostly western aids, which is why they are eyed
suspiciously by many in the parliament. A parliamentary com-
mittee in 2004 examining the operation of NGOs decided that
western organizations threaten the security of Ukraine through
these NGOs (Freedom House, 2005 [12] [13]).
The authoritarian political system of Belarus can be identi-
fied with the name of President Alexander Lukashenko, who
has started his third term of office since his election in 1994.
His presidential career started when in 1994 the president of
the Supreme Council, Stanislav Shushkevich (in power 1991-
1994), was removed from office on corruption charges. Instead
of Prime Minister Kebich, the winner of the first presidential
election of the newly independent Belarus was, by a landslide
(45.1% in the first and 80.1% in the second round), Lukashenko
with a leftist, anti-corruption programme. He owed much of his
success to the price liberalization of 1992 and the commence-
ment of privatization in 1993. These, together with high in-
flation and unemployment rates made his programme, promis-
ing the security and comfort of the past, appealing in the eyes
of many. His presidency – which was called “sultanism” by
Eke and Kuzio (2000) [9] – brought forth the destruction of
the already weak democratic establishment, and resulted in the
international press dubbing the political system of Belarus as
“the last post-Soviet stronghold of Stalinism”. During the first
years of his presidency he called of privatization, gradually es-
tablished a centralized governance of the economy, and did not
let disparity in society grow. Thus, he had strengthened his basis
by introducing measures in the perceivable economy.
Lukashenko also tried to ward off any possible protests. A
milestone in achieving total presidential power was the 1996
referendum, which amended the constitution so that the gov-
ernment became totally dependent on the president. His power
was further enhanced by the general election in 2000 (boycotted
by the opposition), the 2001 presidential election, and the 2003
local election. At these latest local elections the candidates of
the opposition gained a mere 1% of the votes (Freedom House,
2006 [14]). Elections are only formal ceremonies now, marred
by the harassment of the opposition-leaders, arrests and the bias
of the state-owned media (Amnesty International, 2004 [1]).
At the 2004 referendum to lift the constitutional ban on run-
ning for the presidency for the third time, more than 77% of the
electorate voted in favour of the constitutional change, although
both the opposition and international observes declared the ref-
erendum unfair. Lukashenko managed to retain his power in the
March 2006 presidential election, gaining 86.2% of the votes.
Today, parliament and local governments are all but weightless,
and public administration leans heavily on the old nomenclature.
As the presidential power grew stronger, the opposition be-
came increasingly marginalized. The lack of public sphere, re-
taliation against the critics of the government, the trials based
on fabricated charges, the forceful suppression of protests and
demonstrations have practically eliminated the opposition since
the mid 1990s. Some of the leaders and activists of the oppo-
sition, among them Yuri Zakharenko, former Interior Minister,
have disappeared (Amnesty International, 2004 [1]). Zianon
Pazniak, leader of the Belarussian People’s Front chose to leave
the country and was granted political asylum in the United States
(Belarus Miscellany, 2006 [2]).
The government has waged war on independent or pro-
opposition NGOs and the media. There are no independent
unions anymore: the arrests of their leaders and the monopoly of
the state-controlled “unions” have made the democratic enforce-
ment of workers’ interests practically impossible. The Federa-
tion of Trade Unions of Belarus, led by Leonid Kozik, has be-
come a puppet of the government. The Federation was the offi-
cial “initiator” of the 2004 referendum. The unions of indepen-
dent industries (the automotive and agricultural machine man-
ufacturers) refused the new leadership of the Federation, and
tried to retain their independence. The government, in response
to this, formed new trade unions in these sectors by legislation
integrated the “renitent” sectors into the Federation (ILO, 2004
[26]). Those leaders of the Unions who dared protest or speak
out against the measures of the government were arrested for a
while (Freedom House, 2005 [12]).
A similar tendency can be seen among NGOs: the loyal orga-
nizations are supported both financially and by the media, while
independent NGOs have been marginalized and put in an im-
possible situation, usually by some fabricated reason (Freedom
House, 2005 [12]).
Independent media has also been in an increasingly difficult
situation. The only independent radio station was banned in
1996 and the bank accounts of about half a dozen independent
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papers were frozen. In 2003, the major independent daily, Be-
lorusskaya Delovaya Gazeta, was banned for three months and
the broadcast of the most popular Belarussian-speaking televi-
sion channel was suspended. The new law on mass communica-
tion permits the censorship of the internet, too. Apart from the
above-mentioned, the ways of oppressing the independent me-
dia and rewarding the loyal media are extensive: ranging from
the far-reaching licences of the Ministry of Information to the
different cost of publishing and the government funds. As a re-
sult of all these, circulation of Narodnaya Volya, an independent
daily newspaper has diminished from 80,000 in the mid-90s to
30,000 in the first years of the new century, although the circu-
lation of the major pro-government daily also decreased from
430,000 to 270,000 between 2001 and 2003 (Freedom House,
2005 [12]) which shows the passive alienation from politics and
the official propaganda.
The problems of transition have often led to nationalism in the
post-communist countries. But in Belarus, where the national
identity has been historically quite weak (Burant, 1995 [7]), the
official ideology (a peculiar populist-pragmatist mixture of So-
viet nostalgia, conservatism, nationalism and anti-westernism)
has questioned the independence of the educational and scien-
tific spheres. In education, emphasis is put on teaching ideol-
ogy and as for scientific works; they must always express the
official standpoint. In some educational institutions the leaders
supporting the opposition have been removed. As a result of an
increasingly open Russification, only 8% of secondary school
children attend Belarussian-speaking schools (Freedom House,
2005 [12]), while only 3% of broadcast by the Belarussian state
television is in Belarussian.
The repressive political system does not allow much room
for the articulation of discontent, and inhibits the demand for
political and economic changes. Therefore this can be regarded
as one of the most important obstacles of transition.
5 Conclusions
Following the transformational shock, there is some conver-
gence traceable between the macroeconomic figures (growth
rate, inflation rate and unemployment rate) of Ukraine and Be-
larus. The political systems of the two countries, however, are
more divergent than convergent nowadays. Ukraine has em-
barked on a rapid democratization process, while in Belarus, in
an increasing number of areas, the democratic efforts are being
cracked down upon.
The convergence of these macroeconomic data must be put
into perspective from the three points. Firstly, most of the post-
socialist countries are over the transformational recession al-
ready, therefore the improvement and convergence of the eco-
nomic indicators is almost a necessity, though there are a lot
of different tendencies in the political systems (parliamentary,
semi-presidential, presidential or authoritarian) in the Eastern-
European region at the moment. In other words, the similarity
in the political systems, like Minsk and Kiev, is not necessary.
Secondly, Belarus got over the transformational shock sooner
than other countries; due largely to administrative interference
and external (mainly Russian – see Kuzio, 2001 [28]) economic
aid, which also meant that the rapid swing over the recession and
the improvements in the perceivable economy helped the Be-
larussian political elite retain and strengthen its positions (voting
system, media, civil society).
This leads us to the third point: the experiments with market
economy reforms in Ukraine resulted in recent years in an eco-
nomic performance slightly worse than that of Belarus, but in the
medium and on the long run they might lead to a relatively more
sustainable and healthier economic growth path, which could in
turn strengthen the positions of the Ukrainian political elite.
To regard the social and economic transformation as an elite-
led process, it does not offer endless possibilities to the elite,
rather it offers alternatives. The recent collapses of the post-
Soviet, Eastern-European political systems have had a num-
ber of reasons. In the case of Belarus, the reasons helping
Lukashenko stay in power are the complete lack of democracy,
the brutal oppressive nature of the political system, the support
of Russia, and the (relative) alleviation of social damages. The
authoritarian power of Lukashenko is based on two pillars: the
administrative (but not at all market-friendly) economic policy,
prioritizing on the indicators of the perceived economy, and the
actions aiming to reduce the channels of the articulation people
can use to express social discontent. The power of Europe’s last
dictator depends on these two pillars, but Lukashenko and those
around him will have a major role in shaping these pillars.
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